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AN EXAMINATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON'S EMPLOYMENT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA AT THE BATTLES OF TRENTON AND PRINCETON
The short winter campaign of 1776-1777, including the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, is one of the most important campaigns of the Revolutionary War. This short campaign kept the colonial army and the revolutionary cause alive at a critical time. Each engagement was a training ground on which the army and its leadership grew with the experiences they gained.
George Washington's generalship matured as well as he learned how to handle his leaders and his army.
All combat units are not equal. Washington knew it then, just as we know it now. As a strategic leader, his mission was to capitalize on the strengths of each unit by assigning it appropriate missions, while at the same time minimizing the risks to the unit. Easier said than done, this task is one that he understood as a leader going into the battles. By looking at his use of the Pennsylvania militia forces under his command at Trenton and Princeton, we can see that he had developed good techniques for maximizing the effectiveness of the militiamen. In this paper I will deal specifically with George Washington's employment of the Pennsylvania militia forces at his disposal and how he used task assignment to protect the units while still gaining benefits from their presence.
MILITIA POLICY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
During the mid-1700's, Pennsylvania's response to providing for its own security was slow and ineffective. The Quaker controlled Pennsylvania Assembly refused to vote a Militia Act directing the forming and arming of a Pennsylvania militia. By default, the local security of villages and homesteads on the frontier was completely the responsibility of the individuals inhabiting the areas. The Assembly held the view that a militia law would offend Quaker tradition by requiring the citizens of the Commonwealth to accept a military obligation and take up arms 1 .
Indian confrontations on the Pennsylvania frontier continued to increase, and residents continued to petition the Assembly for a Militia Act. In December of 1747 the Pennsylvania Gazette published a proposal by Benjamin Franklin calling for volunteers to form armed and organized companies. His document, the Articles of Association, spurred the growth of Associator companies. 2 These Associators, as they became known, were subject to weekly drill and had to supply themselves with "a good Firelock, Cartouche-box [flintlock and cartridge box], at least 12 Charges of Powder and Ball, and as Many of us as conveniently can, a good Sword, Cutlass or Hanger, to be kept always in our respective Dwellings in Readiness and good
Order." 3 Although not sponsored by the colony, the Associators were the first organization formed for the defense of the colony.
In November 1755, the Assembly passed The Militia Act of 1755 authorizing a provincial militia. The defeat of Braddock's force in Western Pennsylvania in the summer of 1755, the growing Indian threat and local massacres, and finally pressure from the Crown, succeeded in pushing the Assembly to pass the act. Although this was Pennsylvania's first Militia Act, it really did little more than formalize the volunteer militia. Men still could not be forced to take up arms, they did not have to serve at any location more than three days march from their home, and they could not be required to serve for a period longer than three weeks. 4 Although the resulting force was not a true militia, the Act was still a great victory for those who wanted a militia. As time passed, Quaker control of the Assembly weakened, and in 1757, it passed an act that required all able-bodied men to register for service.
Although this new Act required registration, the Associators continued to be the force of choice in Pennsylvania. They were low cost, they had low resource requirements since each man armed and equipped himself, and they were all volunteers so there were no complaints of forced participation. These men carried the brunt of the defense of the state from 1747 through the early years of the revolution. Every other English colony in America had a compulsoryservice militia requiring every able-bodied freeman of appropriate age to bear arms and undergo military training. The Pennsylvania government still refused to require such service. terms. Soldiers could serve no more than 60 days consecutive active duty. 6 Although not a perfect solution in terms of continuity and formation, at least Pennsylvania now had a formal militia. As with any militia unit, training, equipment, and leadership varied greatly from unit to unit and county to county.
ASSOCIATOR/MILITIA CHARACTERISTICS
The discipline of the new militia units was certainly not to Washington's desired European standard. They were not drilled to strict obedience, and even when formed into units, the Associators and militiaman still favored fighting in loose formations. The units were led by officers elected by the men. Officers were generally elected because of their social status in the community or because of particular warfighting skills they had demonstrated in engagements with the Indians over the years. Experience in leadership and training was almost nonexistent.
While they shared many similarities with the militias from other colonies, the Pennsylvania Associators were experienced in Indian fighting. These men were still involved in frequent fights on the frontier. Many were essentially professional Indian fighters, moving from hot spot to hot spot to protect their families and their friends. They came from the forests where their individualism, independence, and self-reliance kept them alive on a daily basis. No amount of talk or drill was going to convince them to stand and exchange volleys with Redcoats at 50 yards. They had never fought that way, they saw Braddock defeated when he fought that way, and to them there was no honor to be gained by fighting in a fashion they all considered crazy.
Of these men, few could be forced to stand in the open and exchange volleys with a British enemy. The experience of the Associators became indispensable.
Their weapons were also not developed for formation fighting. In general, they appeared for battle armed with rifles, not the smoothbore musket/bayonet combination of the Continentals and the British. The rifles were hunting weapons, developed for dropping deer and turkeys at significant ranges. While very accurate and perfect for sniping at Indians in the forest, they were inadequate for volley exchanges. Slow loading and bayonetless, the rifle was no more than a club in hand-to-hand combat. Although the British feared the rifles for their accuracy at long range, they soon learned to close the distance with quick rushes and volleys and finish with a bayonet charge that would inevitably break the militia formations in panic. there were few leaders with the necessary experience to train such an army. The training of the army had to come from experience in battle and each "lesson" was costly. Lastly, there was not enough time to train this army-the war was on, and the fight had to be engaged with the army at hand. The time, skill, manpower, and resources were not available for Washington to build the army he wanted; therefore, his challenge was to determine how to best use the assets he had available.
MILITARY BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
One of these major assets was the militia. George Washington knew that he had to find a way to effectively use the militia forces at his disposal. Although generally less capable than the continental army, collectively these militias were more robust in terms of manpower. Colonists were more likely to turn out to fight when fighting was in the proximity of their homes than they were to join a force that traveled far from their home turf to fight. As fighting moved from region to region, local militias turned out to augment the Continental Army. So, although there were always significant numbers of militia, Washington never knew from battle to battle how many militiamen would actually be fighting. were not small challenges for him to overcome. Washington's eventual understanding of his situation and his development of methods to best utilize the militia forces assigned to him was perhaps one of his greatest accomplishments as a leader.
George Washington knew that the militia had strengths that he could use against the British regulars. He saw the advantages of the irregular style of forest warfare, but at the same time he knew the need for drill and control on the battlefield. His challenge throughout the war would be to balance the two. Washington needed to find a way to keep the militia involved. He needed their local knowledge, he needed their scouting ability, and he needed them to harass the British. Perhaps, most of all, the militia provided a critical link to the local populace; a tie essential for the revolution's success.
During the December 1776 -January 1777 time period George Washington demonstrated that he understood the limitations of the militia and at the same time knew that it could provide valuable services to the cause. He used it wisely throughout this period, capitalizing on its abilities and mitigating its weaknesses.
CAMPAIGN SETTING
The winter campaign was preceded by nearly complete British victory in New York. The
Redcoats pushed the young colonial army out of the city, and, in fact, out of the New York colony altogether. There was no silver lining to this loss for General Washington. He had been outfought and out-generaled. Winter was approaching, and with it the campaign season was closing for the year. Washington withdrew his forces into Pennsylvania hoping to avoid major engagements with the British until he had time to regroup and retrain his force. Not expecting active campaigning again until early spring, Washington began to focus his efforts on planning and preparing for the following summer's operations.
Washington's strategy at this point, which was reflected in his plan for upcoming operations against the British, was to protect his army. Losing fights with the British was costly in manpower and supplies, but perhaps more importantly it was costly in government support, civilian morale, and soldier morale. Washington knew he had to fight the British, but he also knew that another defeat like New York might spell the end of the Revolution and bring an early death of the colonial cause. His overall campaign strategy became a "defensive" one but not one that relied entirely on defensive tactics.
In this short campaign, Washington succeeded with maneuver, always looking for positional advantage over the opposing British force. If he was outmaneuvered, he avoided the fight. Nathaniel Greene summed up the strategy perfectly: "Tis our business to study to avoid any considerable misfortune, and to take post where the enemy will be obliged to fight us, and not us them." 12 For George Washington saving the Army became synonymous with saving the cause.
This campaign was the first look General Washington gave the British at what was to be his strategy for the remainder of the war. He was maturing as a commander and was learning. As the war continued he offered the British fewer set piece battles. Direct force-on-force battle provided the opportunity for tallying victories on the battlefield, but Washington knew that a single decisive defeat could mean complete loss of the war for the colonials. "Previously, General Washington's primary thrust had been to defeat enemy forces; now his foremost imperative was to prevent a decisive defeat of his own army. 
ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BATTLES OF THE CAMPAIGN
ST TRENTON, DECEMBER 26, 1776
As George Washington led the colonial army out of New York, the recent defeat at Fort
Washington was fresh in everyone's mind. The army was dejected. It had lost nearly every battle with the British in the last five months and was again being driven from the battlefield.
The colonial cause was in great jeopardy. Morale of both the army and the people was at ebb.
Borderline supporters of the revolution were shifting back to the British side, and Congress had fled the capital of Philadelphia for the relative safety of Baltimore. The army had been reduced through casualties, enlistment expirations, and disease from about 20,000 to only 8,000 men.
17
Of the 8,000, many had service obligations that were to expire at the end of the year. 18 About 1,100 of the men fleeing from New York were the remnants of 2,500 Pennsylvania Associators that served Washington in New York. 19 While Washington's army was retreating in November and December of 1776, the British under Howe were enjoying yet another victory. Morale of the British army was correspondingly high, and there was no evidence that expectations should not remain so through the winter.
There was a real possibility that the war against the rebels could be completed with victory the following spring. Howe's forces followed the Continental Army across New Jersey, to the While Washington did not specifically direct Ewing's river crossing operations, he was keen enough to take advantage of the information they provided and the effect they had of harassing the Hessians to the north and south of Trenton. Ewing and other independent militia commanders executed small operations on priority targets inside their own areas of operations, almost at will, and then faded away into the countryside. The militia was successful in keeping the British on edge and in providing Washington the intelligence he needed.
As Washington designed his plan for the battle he again assigned specific missions to the militia units. In this case he clearly made a conscious decision to assign supporting tasks to the militia. Success or failure of the militia missions would not heavily impact the overall success of the outcome of the battle. Trenton was a significant loss for the British Army. Two thousand four hundred colonials fought 1,500 Hessians in a two hour battle that had lasting effects and an impact far beyond the scale of the battle. 31 The short, surprise engagement cost the Hessians 918 men--22 killed, 83 seriously wounded and 896 captured. 32 Colonial casualties were almost nonexistent. Two soldiers froze to death along the line of march and four men were wounded in the engagement. 33 This relatively small event had incredible importance on the world stage and pumped a new vigor into the men who fought for Washington and the leaders who led them.
This single victory saved the Army from almost certain collapse in the coming winter and set the stage for a short ten-day winter campaign that revived the force.
2D TRENTON, JANUARY 2, 1777
On January 2, 1777, there was a second battle of Trenton. Overshadowed by the news of the first victory that was still being passed through the countryside, this victory was less spectacular than the first but provides another look at Washington's employment of the militia in a fight that would require holding a defensive line against a deliberate British attack. His understanding of the militiaman's inability to stand toe-to-toe with the British regular is apparent in his task assignment and positioning of militia units to repel the assault. Associators, who were as yet unengaged, to reinforce the main line of battle near the bridge. 37 In making this reallocation of forces, Washington expected that the Associators would stand against the British if they were paired with a strong Continental unit. He still realized they could not be assigned this type task alone because they lacked the discipline to hold in the face of a British assault.
While this second battle of Trenton was certainly less spectacular, it was no less revealing in looking at Washington's understanding of his militia. Interspersing the militia units amongst the regulars was certainly not doctrine of the time. Washington broke up the Pennsylvania militia into smaller elements, and by doing so he allowed the steadiness of the regulars in the face of a determined attack to help "prop" up the spirits of the militia and keep them from breaking and running. Militia forces were known for their lack of ability to withstand a British attack. Although they deserved this reputation, one must also remember that their equipment did not include the musket/bayonet combination needed for hand-to-hand combat.
This second Battle of Trenton also ended on favorable terms for the Colonials. The British lost an estimated 365 men killed, wounded, and captured. The Colonial losses were estimated to be around 50. 38 Although they suffered fewer casualties, in this fight Cornwallis led the British personally, which increased the political and morale impact of the loss.
PRINCETON, JANUARY 3, 1777
The Battle of Princeton, was the final engagement of the short colonial offensive that closed the 1776 campaign. After the British attempts to force a crossing at Assunpink Creek on the evening of 2 January, General Washington held a council of war. His scouts determined that Cornwallis was moving some of his forces to the east and concentrating them in a wooded area with the intent of flanking the colonial right the following morning. 39 A mounted reconnaissance had also determined that the road network was clear to Princeton and Brunswick, the British rear. 40 The council agreed on a plan for a nighttime withdrawal from current positions and a night march to Princeton with the intent of striking the British forces remaining there. While Washington closed his force on Princeton, the British there were already moving out of town to join Cornwallis at Trenton. Cornwallis had previously ordered Colonel Mahood, the British commander at Princeton, to move his brigade to reinforce Trenton. As Greene's column moved northwest along the creek toward Worth's Mill, it encountered British forces already forming in line of battle. 46 The British had seen them first and had already begun forming in line.
Greene and victories were erased in this short ten-day campaign. British papers had all winter to lament the defeat handed to their forces by the colonial rabble, and the debates on how and why this happened carried through the winter spreading doubt that an eventual victory was assured. As word of the campaign spread through Europe, even Frederick the Great commented that the Christmas campaign was "the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military achievement." 50 The battles forced the British to admit that they were not invincible.
On Washington knew that militiamen could provide great local knowledge and experience, they were extremely patriotic and wanted to contribute to the cause, they were good at scouting, harassing, and taking part in small scale attacks. At the same time he realized that the militia was not good at large scale European engagements at close range. They were not armed with bayonets. They did not have the discipline to stand and exchange volleys with the British. The techniques used by George Washington in this short campaign to handle the militia served him well throughout the rest of the revolution. As a leader, he overcame his prejudices toward the ruffians of the militia and developed techniques that allowed him to use them to their maximum effectiveness and at the same time protect their weaknesses.
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